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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Economists have long held that firms’ market power to set price above marginal cost is inversely 
related to the number of firms competing in the market. However, it has been a serious challenge to 
establish the number of competing firms necessary to ensure effective competition. Lack of data on 
prices, quantities, product characteristics, and cost structures makes it difficult to separate out the demand, 
technological, and strategic factors determining firms’ entry, exit, and market concentration. 
 A solution proposed in a series of prominent papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990, and 
1991) is to link entry thresholds with changes in firms’ competitive conduct using cross sectional 
variation in the number of firms. If the first entrant has monopoly power to charge a high price, it can 
recover fixed entry and production costs with a relatively small number of units sold or customers served. 
As additional firms enter, their power to set price may diminish relative to the first entrant. As prices fall, 
a larger number of units or customers served are needed in order to recover the fixed costs. A greater 
market size increase is then necessary to induce the second entrant than was needed to induce the first 
entrant. An even larger market size increase is necessary to induce the third entrant than the second, and 
so on. Once entry thresholds stabilize with additional entrants, one can presume that further entry will not 
generate further changes in firms’ competitive conduct. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) find that once the 
market has three to five firms, the next entrant makes little difference in the market’s competitive 
conduct. 
The Bresnahan and Reiss (henceforth BR) methodology has become enormously influential in the 
field of empirical industrial organization. The combination of a reduced-form profit function with a game 
theoretic model of entry and competition allows inferences to be drawn about firms’ strategic behavior 
from available data on market structure.  However, BR have always been clear about the limitations to 
their methodology. First, the procedure is best suited to geographically distinct local service markets so 
that researchers can clearly define market boundaries. Mobile populations may be willing to drive a 
considerable distance to access some service providers such as health practitioners or auto dealers, 
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making it difficult to pin down the exact number of firms operating in the local market. Second, 
researchers often find that entry threshold ratios vary significantly across industries, implying large 
differences in competitive conduct across industries.1 These large differences in threshold ratios may 
suggest more variation in competitive conduct than actually exists. Differences in sunk costs or regulatory 
environment across industries are suggested, but not really investigated. Lastly, BR’s framework is based 
on cross sectional observations of markets in long-run equilibrium. A more realistic entry game needs to 
capture the dynamic feature of entry and exit, especially in markets where long-run equilibrium has not 
been achieved.  
In a 1994 article, BR more directly explore the importance of sunk costs on entry and exit 
dynamics using two repeated cross-sections of data on the location of rural dentists.  Finding dentists’ exit 
thresholds well below their entry thresholds, they conclude that sunk costs play a significant role in 
dentists’ entry decisions. While data limitations forced their empirical model to fall short of their desired 
fully dynamic model with forward-looking firms, their paper does illustrate that sunk costs can have large 
effects on estimated thresholds, and therefore, researchers’ inference about firm conduct, even in a 
relatively stagnant service industry. 
After BR’s seminal work, the literature on empirical entry games has progressed along two  lines. 
The first extends the static BR framework  to accommodate differences among firms into the model 
instead of imposing the BR assumption of homogeneous firms.2 Many of these papers consider growing 
industries rather than the relatively stable rural retail and professional sectors used in the BR analysis, but 
these papers rarely discuss the role of sunk costs on entry. The other line initiated by Ericson and Pakes 
                                                 
1
 For example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) show quite remarkable differences in entry threshold ratios between 
professional and retail industries.  
2
 Berry (1992) allows firm-specific error terms in his study of the airline market. Toivanen and Waterson (2000, 
2004) and Jia (2007) distinguish leaders and followers in the analysis of the UK fast food market and U.S discount 
retail industries. Mazzeo (2002 a, b), Dranove, Gron, and Mazzeo (2003), Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006), and 
Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) introduce quality differentiation into the BR framework in studies of motel, HMO, 
telecommunication markets, and retail depository institutions. Danis (2003) makes use of the identities of local 
exchanges in analyzing the equity option market. Seim (2005) allows firms to possess private information in the 
video retail industry. 
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(1995) studies dynamic oligopoly entry games. In a dynamic setting, a potential entrant compares the 
discounted expected future payoff of entry to the sunk costs of entry. These entry costs play a pivotal role 
in determining market structure and industry evolution. The distribution of entry cost is usually recovered 
from the distribution of entry decisions, conditioning on some market-level attributes determining post-
entry payoffs (Aguirregabiria & Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard & Levinson, 2007; Pakes, Ostrovsky & 
Berry, 2007; Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler, 2003). These models, which are more general and realistic 
compared to the static entry models, are however much more complicated to estimate and require data on 
the identities of entrants and their timing of entry (Collard-Wexler, 2008; Ryan, 2009; Dunne, Klimek, 
Roberts, & Xu, 2009). 
 We draw from both lines of these literatures, incorporating the sunk entry costs central to the 
dynamic entry games into BR’s 1991 framework and exploiting the rich information provided by the 
entry and exit patterns over time. Specifically, we allow two types of firms operating in a market at any 
given time: entrants (who did not exist in the previous period) and incumbents (who can plan either to 
stay for the next period or to exit at the end of this period). We then link these firms’ decisions regarding 
entry, continuation or exit to market size variations. New entrants, who incur sunk costs in order to enter a 
market, will only enter when market size has grown enough to cover their entry costs. Incumbent firms, 
however, do not take entry costs into consideration when deciding whether to continue operations or exit. 
This distinction allows us to identify entry costs by comparing the entry thresholds for markets which 
have experienced entry or exit to entry thresholds for markets experiencing no entry or exit.   
 Our strategy keeps the basic econometric framework of BR 1991 intact and uses BR 1994’s idea 
about entry and exit thresholds. Our method differs from BR 1994 in our adaptation of the original static 
BR framework, which is more transparent in identification and more tractable in computation.3 In terms 
of modeling, ours concedes to the richer, more general dynamic models of entry as referenced above. 
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 We also follow the convention in later research by using a reduced form profit function that does not distinguish 
between variable profits and fixed costs of production.   
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With more readily available cross-sectional data on market structure, however, our model may offer an 
improvement over the original BR framework because researchers often lack data to bring a full blown 
dynamic model of entry to estimation. 
We apply our adapted framework to time series observations of zip-code-level local market 
structure for providers of high-speed lines for Internet access in the United States. The commercial 
provision of broadband services has expanded rapidly since 1998. The Federal Trade Commission (FCC) 
requires every facilities-based provider with at least 250 high-speed lines to report basic information 
about its service offerings and end users twice a year to the Commission. The FCC then releases summary 
statistics to the public aggregated to the zip code level, which provides us 9 snapshots of the number of 
firms competing in each broadband market. Like other telecommunication industries, the competitive 
conduct of this thriving market has been subject to scrutiny.4 An important policy goal of the FCC is to 
promote competition in the marketplace by encouraging the entry of smaller, competitive providers. To 
achieve this policy goal, several questions must be addressed: What factors encourage or deter provider 
entry in a local market? How many providers must exist in a local market to reduce or eliminate market 
power? Do entry costs vary with the order of entry? Is the industry becoming increasing competitive over 
time? Our empirical model can address all of these questions, showing the relationship between the 
number of providers in a local broadband market and competitive conduct, and how that relationship has 
changed over time. 
Our empirical findings are striking. Results without sunk entry costs imply that entry conditions 
vary dramatically over time for the 4th firm entering a 1-to-3 firm local oligopoly market. In particular, 
entry conditions become increasingly more difficult for the 4th firm. This unreasonable variation in entry 
conditions disappears when the estimation accommodates entry and exit. Entry conditions for the 4th firm 
and subsequent entrants are stable, implying that new firm entrants beyond the first three firms have little 
                                                 
4
 For policy debate and strategic conduct in the telecommunication industries, see the work of Augereau, Greenstein, 
and Rysman (2005), Greenstein (2000), and Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) and the edited volume by Crandall and 
Alleman (2002).  
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effect on competitive conduct. We also find that entry costs for early entrants are smaller than for later 
entrants, implying the existence of early mover advantages in this market. Overall, our results imply that 
sunk costs are a main determinant of entry thresholds. Ignoring sunk costs leads to biased measures of 
entry thresholds and misleading inferences about firms’ competitive conduct. Although our results are 
subject to empirical misspecification due to data limitation ---- in particular, the FCC lumps 1 to 3 local 
providers into a single category ---- we believe our work conveys a clear message that calls for the use of 
more dynamic entry models to generate accurate assessments of industry competitive environment. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our methodology. Section 3 introduces the 
broadband market and the data we use. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Sunk Costs and the Dynamic BR Framework 
 BR (1991) relate shifts in market demand to changes in the equilibrium number of firms. Their 
method works best with personal service industries where there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
local population and sales. In their model, each firm’s profit is defined as the difference between its 
variable profits and its fixed operating cost.5 To induce one more firm to enter a market, market size as 
proxied by the population has to rise so that variable profits generated by the increase can cover fixed 
operating costs. Suppose the population must increase by ns  to support the entry of the thn firm while it 
takes an additional 1ns +  to support entry of the stn 1+  firm. If the fixed operating costs remain the same 
for all entrants, then the change from ns  to 1ns +  tells us how quickly firms’ variable profits fall as an 
additional firm enters. For instance, if the population increase necessary to induce entry of the 2nd firm is 
four times that necessary to induce entry of the 1st firm, then firms’ variable profits and competitive 
conduct must have changed drastically in moving from a monopoly to a duopoly regime. Therefore, the 
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 Note that fixed operating costs are not sunk costs ---- sunk entry costs do not play a role in the static BR model. 
 6 
entry threshold ratio 
1n
n
s
s
+
 measures the change in competitive conduct as market structure changes from 
n  firms to 1n +  firms. 
1n
n
s
s
+
 will be constant over time provided there is no change in market 
competitive conduct, entry and production costs change uniformly across firms, and there is no change in 
minimum efficient scale.6 
The  static BR framework can be easily estimated using commonly available cross-sectional data 
on market structure, however, it abstracts away timing of entry and exit, firm and product heterogeneity, 
incumbents’ and entrants’ expectations about post-entry competition, and most importantly, “the size and 
sunkness of set-up costs”(Berry & Reiss, 2006). Theory has been abundant on the central role of sunk 
costs on firms’ strategic entry decisions. In the most straightforward way, sunk costs are irreversible, 
unrecoverable, direct investment costs for entrants to start businesses.7 However, there are at least three 
other potential components of sunk costs. First, incumbents’ strategic behavior, e.g. preemption and entry 
barriers, may lower the entrants’ expected discounted future profits. In this situation, potential entrants 
will delay entry as if there were higher sunk costs to enter.8 Second, the costs consumers face in switching 
from incumbents to the new entrant, which are especially important in telecommunication industries, may 
also create disadvantages for later entrants. These disadvantages will, again, delay entry as if there were 
higher sunk costs for later entrants. Lastly, when potential entrants decide to enter under less-than-
perfectly predictable market conditions, they give up the option to wait for new information about the 
likely return of their investment (Pindyck, 2005). Forgone benefits can be interpreted as costs, and since 
entry is an irreversible decision, these costs are sunk.   
                                                 
6
 See Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) section II for how entry threshold ratios change with minimum efficient scale in a 
Cournot oligopoly model.  
7
 Expenses avoidable if the firm decides to exit, such as rental fees, should not be considered sunk costs. 
8
 Baumol et al. (1982) point out that “the need to sink costs can be a barrier to entry” because incumbents may 
subject entrants to higher expected cost. For a review on strategic models of entry deterrence, see Wilson (1992).  
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To distinguish between these different types of sunk costs calls for a full-fledged dynamic model 
(such as Ericson and Pakes, 1995) and detailed firm-level data over several time periods.9 Even equipped 
with the right theory and data, estimation is often plagued with complicated econometric and computation 
issues. A practical solution and a first step into the topic is to focus on the difference in expected future 
returns between entrants and incumbents. The goal is to quantify the size of overall sunk costs. BR (1994) 
propose that the differences between entry and exit thresholds provide information about the magnitude of 
sunk costs. They build a highly stylized two-period model, in which firms are forward-looking to the 
demand and competitive conditions in the next period. However, they only have two years of data, 1980 
and 1988 observations on rural dentists. In the actual estimation, they have to treat the first period as a 
static reduced form as they do not know the entry patterns for the first period. They also constrain the 
number of firms in a hypothetical third period to be the same as in 1988 because they lack data for a third 
period. With all these limitations, however, BR demonstrate convincingly the existence of significant 
sunk costs and their impact on inferences regarding competition conduct. Their original static framework 
implied that the entry of the 2nd firm significantly changed the competitive conduct in the local market 
while the third entrant had little effect. Allowing for sunk entry costs, the 2-stage dynamic framework 
indicated that even the 2nd entrant does not change competition. This result, in some sense, is even more 
intriguing than their previous static result, as it implies that the mere existence of potential entrants might 
be sufficient to warrant effective competition. 
Along this line, we develop an adaptation of the BR (1994) model for an industry characterized 
by significant entry and exit, allowing for differences in sunk costs between entrants and incumbents. We 
then apply a variant of the original static BR framework to the same industry for a comparison with our 
adapted model. We show that exploiting the temporal entry and exit patterns of this industry allows us to 
derive conclusions regarding market structure and competitive conduct that seem more plausible than 
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 Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard & Levinson (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky & Berry (2007), and 
Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2003) provide simplifications along this line in order to alleviate the computational 
burden of estimating a discrete dynamic game, but the data requirement is similar. 
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those based on the original static framework. Our adaptation does not have the econometric and 
computational complications of a full-fledged dynamic model. The estimation stays simple, the data 
requirement remains low, and the identification of sunk costs is transparent. We do want to caution that 
our framework does not supplant estimation of the real dynamic model when feasible. After all, entry and 
exit are strategic, dynamic choices which can only be fully understood in a dynamic model with strategic 
interactions.   
2.2 Our Baseline Model 
This model focuses on a key difference between new entrants and incumbents observed in any 
snap shot of a growing market. A potential entrant enters a market when its expected discounted value of 
future profits exceeds sunk entry costs, while an incumbent firm continues operation when its expected 
discounted value of future profits exceeds zero. Therefore the existence of sunk entry costs means that it 
takes less demand to sustain an incumbent than to support a new entrant. The purpose of the theory below 
is to show how firms’ decisions regarding entry, continuation and exit, conditional on local demand and 
thus expected future profitability, will allow us to infer the magnitude of sunk entry costs and their roles 
in determining entry thresholds.  
At time period t , there are mtN = n  ( 0,1,2,...)n =  firms operating in market m , where mtN  is 
the observed number of firms in market m  at time t . Market demand is stochastic. At the end of each 
time period, all firms including potential entrants decide whether to operate in the next period based on 
their ex-ante expected market demand, technological change, and competition with other firms. In 
equilibrium, firms’ expectations are realized. The thn  firm considering entry into (or continuing operation 
in) market m  which has 1n −  incumbent firms at time t  has an expected discounted value of future 
profits of: 
(1) ( )* *n pop nmt m t m t t mt mtPop X I N nβ β µ εΠ = + − = + . 
 9 
In the above formulations, mPop  is the population of market m , and mX contains other market-
level variables that might affect each firm’s variable profits and fixed operating costs. Market size as 
measured by population is the key element, as in the BR study and their follow-ups. In the broadband 
market, plausible elements of mX  include local demographic variables such as gender, race, age and 
education. Local income levels, commuting patterns, and business activities are also plausible demand 
shifters.10  poptβ  and tβ  measures how firms’ time-varying expectations about a market’s profitability are 
determined by mPop  and mX . For example, in 1999 a market with 1000 people might not be expected to 
generate sufficient demand for a single provider of high-speed lines; in 2003 the same 1000 people might 
be able to support two or more. Time-varying poptβ  and tβ  capture changes over time in consumer taste 
and/or technology improvements. ( )mtI N n=  is an indicator function which transforms the market 
structure of the market into data and ntµ  is the (expected and realized) effect on per-firm variable profits 
of the thn  firm entering the market at time t . mtε  denotes market- and time-specific noises affecting 
firms’ expected discounted value of entry or continuation, which are identically and independently 
distributed with: 2(0, )mt N εε σ∼ . The variance of the error term is later normalized to one because it 
cannot be identified in a discrete choice entry framework. The i.i.d. assumption about mtε  will be relaxed 
in an extension to this baseline model.  
Note the above setup assumes away simultaneous entry and exit, and instead focuses on the 
marginal entering or existing firm’s expected profitability from operating in the next period. For example, 
net entry of one firm into an n -firm market may be the result of four new entrants and three exiting 
firms. Instead of modeling all individual firms’ entry and exit decision, we model the marginal entrant’s 
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 Section 3 will offer a detailed discussion on the components of mX . Note that there may be market attributes 
observed by firms that are not available to the econometrician and therefore we offer an extension of the model in 
section 2.4 to account for market-level heterogeneity. 
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expected long-run profits of being the 1thn +  firm operating in the next period. In other words, we do not 
include firm-level idiosyncratic shocks which are necessary to evaluate separately the decisions of some 
firms to enter at the same time that other firms are opting to exit. We make this simplification because our 
data does not identify firm identities or their timing of entry. As all we observe is net entry or exit,  there 
is no empirical gain from modeling entry at the individual firm level.   
Also note that in the formulation of equation (1) we adopt a reduced form profit function in 
contrast to the more structured profit function in the BR framework. BR define profits by market size 
times variable profits then subtract fixed operating costs, with each of these three elements defined as a 
reduced-form linear function. The advantage of such structure is that researchers can allow the number of 
competing firms to enter the variable profits function and the fixed costs function separately, and thus 
allow for different interpretation about the role of market structure. Later researchers do not make this 
distinction, modeling profit by a single reduced form equation (see Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002 a, b), and 
Seim (2005) for notable examples). This is because they usually do not have separate measures of 
variable profits and fixed costs, and because variable profits do not necessarily increase in proportion to 
market size.11 And for the same reasons, we decide to adopt a reduced form profit function.    
Now we introduce tSC  as a measure of the time-varying entry costs. The recoverable part of 
entry costs is part of the sell-off value an incumbent incorporates into the decision of whether or not to 
exit. Here we normalize the expected future sell-off values to zero.12 For now we assume all entrants incur 
the same entry costs regardless of the order of entry, but we will relax this assumption in an extension to 
this baseline model.  
In the data, there are three possible situations that would generate the observation of n  firms in 
market m at time t : 
                                                 
11
 A larger market size, for instance, usually supports greater product variety and thus generates more variable 
profits due to product differentiation. 
12
 Even if we incorporate a positive selloff value into the model this selloff value cannot be separately identified 
from the sunk cost and competitive conduct parameters. This normalization will not affect entry threshold ratios or 
exit threshold ratios. 
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1)  One or more firms have entered and there were fewer than n  firms at time 1t − , or 
, 1mt m tN N −> .  
For the thn firm, the expected discounted value of entry exceeds sunk costs of entry, while for the 
stn 1+ firm not. This can be expressed as:  
1&n nmt t mt tSC SC
+Π ≥ Π < . 
2)  No firm has entered or exited a market with n  firms, or 
, 1mt m tN N −= .  
The thn  firm from period 1t −  has decided to stay because its expected discounted values of continuation 
exceed 0, while the stn 1+ firm has expected a loss from entry. That is:  
10 &n nmt mt tSC
+Π ≥ Π < . 
3)  One or more firms have exited and there were more than n  firms at time 1t − , or 
, 1mt m tN N −< . 
The market has become unprofitable when more than n  firms stayed operating. The marginal firm, the 
stn 1+ one, expected that it would be unprofitable to stay in the market; when this firm left, the thn  firm 
expected otherwise. That is:  
10 & 0n nmt mt
+Π ≥ Π < . 
The following econometric model can nest the above three situations. For a given market m at 
time t  with n  firms providing services, we can write down the likelihood of this individual market 
structure as:  
(2)    ( )
( )
, 1
1
, 1 , 1
( )
( * * * [ ])
( * * 1 * [ ] * [ ])
mt
pop n
m t m t t mt t mt m t
pop n
m t m t t mt t mt m t t mt m t
prob N n
Pop X I N n SC I N N
Pop X I N n SC I N N SC I N N
β β µ
β β µ
−
+
− −
=
= Φ + − = − >
−Φ + − = + − > − =
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where [.]I  is an indicator function and [.]Φ  is the cumulative density function of a standard normal 
distribution. When 
, 1[ ] 1mt m tI N N −> = , we have the first situation; when , 1[ ] 1mt m tI N N −= = , we have 
the second situation; when 
, 1[ ] 0mt m tI N N −> =  and , 1[ ] 0mt m tI N N −= = , we have the third situation.13 
In the above model, we have a unique equilibrium because entrants and incumbents are assumed 
to be post-entry identical. The identities of entrants and incumbents may be undetermined but their 
number is unique given market characteristics and model parameters. This follows from the BR solution 
to the multiple equilibria problem in a typical entry game. The parameter vector to be estimated is 
[ , , , ]pop nt t t tSCθ β β µ= .14 We then employ maximum likelihood methods to estimate this parameter 
vector: 
(3) 
1,...,
arg max ln( ( ) | ).mt
m M
prob N nθ θ
=
= =∑  
2.3 Interpretation and Identification 
In the above model, a critical issue is how we distinguish from tSC  from 
n
tµ . In the original BR 
framework, all firms are incumbents in a long-run equilibrium market structure and the likelihood of 
observing n  firms in market m  at time t  is: 
(4) ( )
( )1
( )
( * * )
( * * 1 )
mt
pop n
m t m t t mt
pop n
m t m t t mt
prob N n
Pop X I N n
Pop X I N n
β β µ
β β µ +
=
= Φ + − =
−Φ + − = +
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 Note in the above formulation, we treat the change from last period’s market structure as exogenous. An implicit 
assumption for the exogeneity to hold is that the change in market structure is driven by a local idiosyncratic shock 
that was not forecastable when firms in the previous period were forecasting their profits and making their entry, 
stay, and exit decisions.  The implication is that these shocks are independent of last period’s error term in the profit 
function. 
14
 The variance of mtε , 
2
εσ , is normalized to unity as is typical when the dependant variable is discrete. We also 
normalize the constant term in *m tX β  to be zero as it is not identified from the cutoff points ntµ .  
 13 
We can identify the competitive conduct parameter ntµ ’s as the cutoffs in the above ordered Probit 
model. However, sunk costs of entry play no role in such a framework and thus cannot be identified 
empirically. 
In contrast, our model allows identification of the entry costs even when there are no explicit 
measures of sunk entry costs. The identification comes from the variation in entry and exit patterns across 
markets and across time. We employ Figure 1 to illustrate the central idea behind the identification. In 
Figure 1, the horizontal axis measures a firm’s expected profitability without considering the negative 
impact of competitors. As shown here, the distances from ntµ  to nt tSCµ + , from nt tSCµ +  to 1ntµ + , and 
from 1ntµ +  to 1nt tSCµ + + , are now estimable by comparing the demand thresholds inducing the thn  firm 
to enter, forcing the stn 1+ firm to exit, and sustaining n  firms to stay. The extra demand (expressed in   
population) necessary to sustain a n-firm market with net entry that that to sustain a n-firm market without 
net entry or exit identifies tSC .  
To spell things out more accurately, we define _ ntS entry  to be the necessary population to 
support the total of n  firms with net entry from last period in a local market at time t , and _ ntS exit  the 
necessary population to support such a market structure without net entry. With the estimates θ  and the 
entrants’ expected payoff function, we can calculate _ ntS entry  by  
(5) 
  

*
_
n
n t t m t
t pop
t
SC XS entry µ ββ
+ −
= , 
 where mX  is the cross-market average of mX . We can also calculate the exit threshold by 
(6) 
 

*
_
n
n t m t
t pop
t
XS exit µ ββ
−
= .  
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As clearly shown from the calculation of the entry and exit thresholds, sunk costs tSC  constitute the 
difference between the two.  
Lastly, define nts  to be the necessary population to support the entry of the 
thn firm. The entry 
threshold for the thn  firm is _ /n nt ts S entry n= , and the entry threshold ratio progressing from n  to 
1n +  firms is  
(7) 
1 1
_ /( 1)
_ /
n n
t t
n n
t t
s S entry n
s S entry n
+ + +
= . 
 
2.4 Extension 1: Allow Entry Costs to Vary With the Order of Entry 
 As just discussed, we are not able to exactly distinguish between the “necessary” and the 
“strategic” sunk costs. However, we can allow entry costs to vary with the order of entry in the hope of 
capturing the differences in sunk costs between early and later entrants. Early entrants may have early 
mover advantages and therefore have lower sunk costs than later entrants. At the same time, later entrants 
may have accumulated better information and lost less of the option value of waiting. We will not be able 
to offer conclusive evidence about the underlying reasons for differences in sunk costs, but at least we can 
offer some evidence on whether there are differences across early and later entrants. The expected 
discounted value of future payoffs for the thn  firm entering market m  at time t  will be the same as (1), 
but entry costs vary with the order of entry, as embodied by superscript n  in ntSC . Accordingly, the 
likelihood function becomes:  
(8)  ( )
( )
, 1
1
, 1 , 1
( )
( * * * [ ])
( * * 1 * [ ] * [ ])
mt
pop n n
m t m t t mt t mt m t
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m t m t t mt t mt m t t mt m t
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Pop X I N n SC I N N
Pop X I N n SC I N N SC I N N
β β µ
β β µ
−
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= Φ + − = − >
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2.5  Extension 2: Incorporate Spatially Correlated Market-Level Heterogeneity 
 In our baseline model, we assume that variation in market structures is driven by iid market-level 
idiosyncrasies. This is a very restrictive assumption as there is often spatially-correlated unmeasured 
market-level heterogeneity, which causes firms’ entry and exit decisions to be spatially correlated. To 
solve this problem, we propose a random effects model with an aggregate-market-specific error term in 
the profit functions. Specifically, firms offering services in the same county may be subject to a county-
time-specific shock. We can identify this effect because there are multiple markets within a county.  The 
resulting modification of our baseline model is: 
(9) ( )
,
* *
n pop n
mt m t m t t mt county t mtPop X I N nβ β µ η εΠ = + − = + + . 
 
,county tη  is a time-varying mean zero error with the following structure: 
(10) 
_ , _ ,
2
, ,
cov[ , | ]
var[ | ] _ _ ;
0 .
county i t county j t m
county t m county t
X
X if county i county j
otherwise
η η
η σ= = =
=
 
 Estimation of this model involves greater computational burden than the baseline model because 
the likelihood function involves integration over the market random effects 
,county tη . The gain from this 
model is that we can obtain more efficient estimators and understand the role of unobserved market-level 
heterogeneity on market structures. We use the method of simulated maximum likelihood to estimate this 
model. Assuming that there are 
c
M  market in county c  and there are C  counties in total, the simulated 
likelihood function is given as:  
(11) ( )( )11,..., 1
1ln ln
McR
r
simulated mt
m
county C r
L prob N n
R =
= =
   
= Π =  
   
∑ ∑ . 
In the above formulation, R  denotes the number of simulation draws we use for the county-level random 
term 
,county tη  ---- we set R  equal to 50 ---- and rmtN  denotes the simulated market structure under an 
individual simulation draw r . 
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3. THE U.S. BROADBAND MARKET AND THE DATA 
3.1 The U.S. Broadband Market 
 Privatization of the Internet in 1994 opened the door to its commercial use and to competition 
among Internet service providers. Over the decade since, the market for providers of high-speed lines has 
grown rapidly. The number of high-speed lines increased 10 fold from 2.8 million in December 1999 to 
28.2 million in December 2003, the sample for which we have data.15 The vast majority of these lines 
served residential and small business subscribers.16 This sample period dates back almost to the birth of 
the market. The FCC (2000) estimates that only 0.3% of households had broadband service in 1998. By 
the end of 2003, 21% of U.S. households had broadband access. The total number of providers of high-
speed lines has increased from 105 in December 1999 to 432 in December 2003. By December 2003, 
93% of zip codes encompassing 99% of the country’s population had at least one provider of high-speed 
lines, compared to 60% of zip codes in December 1999. Clearly, the market structure for the broadband 
industry was evolving rapidly. 
Providers of high-speed lines provide broadband services by means of several mutually exclusive 
types of technology. The two major types are asymmetric digital subscriber lines (DSL)17 and cable 
modems using hybrid fiber-coaxial cable networks, operated primarily by cable television operators.18 As 
of December 2003, coaxial cable has accounted for 58.3% of all high-speed lines, while DSL has 
accounted for 33.7%. Cable television companies, incumbent local telephone companies (incumbent local 
exchange carriers, or ILECs), and new entrants into telecommunications services (competitive local 
exchange carriers, or CLECs) compete for subscription. Recent rapid technological changes have led to a 
                                                 
15
 FCC (2004) reports most of the statistics we refer to in this section. 
16
 1.8 million high-speed lines served residential and small business subscribers as of December 1999 and 26 
millions lines did so as of December 2003. 
17
 Asymmetric DSL provide speeds in one direction greater than speeds in the other direction. 
18
 Other technologies include: wireline technologies “other” than ADSL, including traditional telephone company 
high-speed services and symmetric DSL services; optical fiber to the subscriber’s premises; and satellite and 
terrestrial wireless systems, which use radio spectrum to communicate with a radio transmitter. 
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sharp decline in the cost of cable and DSL service. Monthly prices were $27 in many areas in 2004, down 
from $40 in 2003. Again, the record on prices and technology suggests that the market is characterized by 
rapid changes. 
While many other governments, most notably Korea, are investing heavily in broadband, the 
United States has left broadband investment mostly to private companies. In recent years, the U.S. 
government’s broadband strategy is to foster competition by reducing regulatory hurdles. The idea is to 
encourage entry and competition, which will lower prices and boost broadband use. Whether this strategy 
works or not boils down to examining entry conditions faced by different firms in different times, the 
focus of this study. 
 
3.2 Market Definition 
In order to determine entry thresholds for providers of high-speed lines, we must first define the 
local market. The market definition hinges on the mobility of consumers’ demand and conventionally 
researchers use criteria focused on demand-side substitutability. However, an important advantage of the 
broadband market is that consumers’ demand has zero mobility---- consumers can only order from 
providers which offer services at their residences. Consequently, we do not face the problem common to 
market structure studies that customers can travel from one market to another, blurring the geographic 
boundaries of a market.19 In the mean time, we cannot adopt traditional market definitions relying on the 
boundaries of geographical areas in which consumers choose products or services. 
Our definition of a local market reflects the supply side consideration and the type of entry 
decision on which we focus.  In this application, we are not concerned with the decision of whether to 
enter or exit the broadband service market more generally, but only on the marginal decision of whether 
an already existing provider will serve one more local market. Our definition of the geographic 
                                                 
19
 However, consumer immobility can be an issue if a provider only covers part of a zip code instead of the entire 
zip code. As detailed in section 3.4, we alleviate this problem by selecting zip codes covering smaller geographical 
areas. 
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boundaries of the market will reflect the sunk costs associated with this marginal market entry decision. 
For example, if the sunk costs of serving a new area were confined to local TV and newspaper 
advertising, we would define the local markets by county or city boundaries that reflect the boundaries of 
the local mass media market.  
The best definition of a local geographic market for our study is a zip code tabulation area, as 
defined by the 2000 Census of Population. The marginal decision of whether or not to serve one more 
area involves sunk costs that are mostly committed at the zip code level, particularly in the less densely 
populated areas that we focus on in this study. These costs involve application of the so-called “last mile” 
technology that connects the switching and distribution centers of local telecommunications and cable 
television companies to the home users of broadband services. Providers of high-speed lines are data 
transporters in this “last mile” of the network. For DSL services data passes over part of the spectrum on 
copper telephone wires; for cable services data pass over part of the spectrum on the coaxial cable that 
distributes cable television.  
Because both services are offered over networks designed for other services, the providers must 
make substantial investments in renovation before serving an area. “Physical” sunk costs of serving an 
additional area are mainly composed of the renovation costs of the existing networks and the costs of 
building switching and distribution centers (Jackson, 2002). “Strategic” sunk costs, including the loss of 
option value and the cost of switching consumers away from incumbent firms, are naturally associated 
with physical sunk costs. The distance between the user’s premises and a phone company’s central office 
or cable installation is a primary factor in deciding which neighborhoods to serve and the speed of these 
services. DSL is typically available within a radius of 3.5 miles of the central office,20 while cable modem 
service areas are larger.  Based on the 2000 population Census, a typical zip code covers a radius of 3 to 4 
miles, roughly consistent with the area that could be covered by a DSL system. Other possible geographic 
                                                 
20
 For example, San Francisco has 24 zip code areas and 12 central offices, none of which are more than four miles 
from each other (Prieger, 2003). 
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boundaries such as cities, counties, or MSAs are too large relative to a broadband service area, and could 
include providers that do not actually compete with each other. This makes zip code areas the most 
appropriate approximation of local markets in the broadband market.21 
The FCC only requires that facilities-based providers report their presence in a given zip code.  
That means that all of the providers in data set will, at minimum, incur costs of laying out network 
facilities. There are, as discussed in section 2, other types of sunk entry costs such as consumers’ 
switching costs, costs caused by incumbents preemptive behavior, and entrant’s option value of waiting. 
It’s likely that these remaining sunk costs will vary by type of firms and order of entry, and we will try to 
capture some of these costs by extension 2.  
We do not focus on the overall decision of whether a given provider enters, remains in, or exits 
business because market distinctions blur. Almost all providers serve multiple areas. A few have national 
or near-national footprints,22 more offer services beyond one city, and hundreds of small providers only 
cover a small geographic area. Different sized providers will differ in their business strategies regarding 
the scale of geographic markets to cover. Markets defined by the overall broadband entry decision will 
overlap, leading to a variety of competitive interactions. Any two providers might compete with one 
another in some geographic areas and not in the others. Without firm identities and firm-specific coverage 
area in our data, the problem of overlapping markets would be insurmountable if we chose to investigate 
providers’ entry decisions at the firm level.   
 
3.3 The Data 
Our primary data set is the Survey of High Speed Internet Providers, conducted every six months 
by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration since December 1999. The surveys 
                                                 
21
 Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2005) take local calling areas as distinct markets to study Internet service 
providers’ adoption of different technology standards for 56K modems. In their study, a provider’s technology 
adoption decisions do not vary with zip codes. However, in our study each zip code may have a distinctive set of 
competitors.  
22
 For example, Time-Warner America Online. 
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report the number of providers for each zip code in the United States. The FCC requires every facilities-
based provider with at least 250 high-speed lines to report basic information about its service offerings 
and end users twice a year to the Commission.23 Each provider is required to report its presence in a given 
zip code as long as it serves at least one customer in that zip code. The FCC then releases summary 
statistics to the public aggregated to the zip code level, which provides us 9 snapshots of the number of 
firms competing in each broadband market. Figure 2 shows that the number of high-speed Internet service 
providers varies substantially over time, across states, and across communities within states.  
The advantage of this dataset is clear. The market of high-speed line providers is growing rapidly 
and there is significant entry and exit during the time span of the data. Moreover, we have a cleaner 
definition of markets than in most of the previous entry studies. The data tell us exactly how many firms 
are competing within a zip code. Because consumers cannot order Internet services from providers not 
servicing their home market, the zip code market boundary is exact. 
  The data set departs from an “ideal” one 24 due to a few major restrictions resulted from the 
FCC’s confidential agreements with the broadband providers. First, we do not know the identities of the 
firms, so we can only observe net instead of actual entry and exit. It is likely that high-speed Internet 
services are correlated across adjacent zip codes as most providers serve more than a single zip code, but 
we only have a crude way to deal with this potential correlation, as shown in the county random effects 
model. Second, cable and DSL are different products that are not perfect substitutes, but we are unable to 
distinguish between them. Mitigating this problem is the similarity in cost and structure for DSL and 
cable modems (Jackson, 2002).25  Third, small providers, many of whom serve sparsely populated areas, 
                                                 
23
 High-speed lines are defined as those that provide speeds exceeding 200 kilobits per second (kbps) in at least one 
direction. 
24
 Citing Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), “ideally, we would like to observe a single industry in which market demand 
has fluctuated enough to cause significant firm turnover.” 
25
 Jackson (2002) compares the costs of cable versus DSL from all aspects: 1) the cost of modems; 2) the cost of 
connecting to the aggregated traffic; 3) the cost of the transmission plants; 4) the cost of the DSL’s central office and 
the cable system’s head end; 5) the cost of marketing, installation, and customer support. He concludes that the costs 
only differ slightly across the two platforms. 
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are not required to report to FCC, potentially causing measurement errors in our econometric analysis.26 
Again fortunately, few providers would fall into this category. Research shows that entry will not pay off 
unless there are at least 200 lines in a DSL service area (Paradyne, 2000). Lastly, the most serious 
drawback is that the FCC summary data by zip code does not distinguish between 1, 2 or 3 providers to 
avoid violating confidentiality. This prevents us from studying the change of competitive conduct from 
the 1st to the 3rd provider.  
To complement the main data, we merge in information from the 2000 Population Census based 
on zip code tabulation areas (ZCTAs).27 Our measure of market size is the population in ZCTAs.28 In 
addition, we use average income, education, age, ethnicity, commuting distance, population density etc. 
as factors affecting local demand for and/or the cost of providing high-speed Internet services. The 
Population Census data are also matched to the Zip Code Business Pattern (2000), which allows us to 
merge in the number of employee-based business establishments for each zip code. We use this variable 
divided by local population as a proxy for local business activities. 
 
3.4 Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
While zip code areas provide a good geographic definition for our broadband markets, we need to 
further refine our market definition to ensure: 1) measurement errors in the data are minimized; 2) a 
market covers a large enough geographic area so that sunk costs must be committed to enter; 3) all 
providers in a market are able to compete with each other. To satisfy these conditions, we select a sample 
                                                 
26
 Small providers (with less than 250 high-speed lines) may provide information on a voluntary basis. 
27
 ZCTAs, defined by the Census Bureau, are not identical to zip codes, defined by the U.S. postal service. However, 
all the zip codes from the FCC data do have a match in the 2000 Census data. 
28
 We could use the number of business establishments in the zip code as an alternative measure of market size. 
However, the size of population and the number of business establishments are highly correlated. In addition, the 
use of population provides a better comparison with BR who also use that same proxy for market size. 
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from the universe of 31913 zip codes in the United States.29 We first sort the data by population density. 
We drop the bottom 5 percent, which corresponds to very sparsely populated rural areas, where the 
measurement error problem is more severe (see section 3.3). We also drop the top 5 percent, which 
corresponds to metropolitan areas (e.g. San Francisco, New York City) where zip codes may not provide 
a sufficiently large area.30  For the rest of the zip code areas, we opt for zip codes with populations below 
the median (roughly 2750) to focus on markets that would be more prone toward an oligopoly structure. 
Furthermore, a zip code with populations above the median covers a much larger geographic area and we 
are concerned that providers serving such a zip code did not compete with each other.31 Our selection 
criteria leave us with 14357 zip codes observations per period over 9 semi-annual time periods from 
December 1999 to December 2003.32   
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the average number of providers and the proportion of zip 
codes experiencing net entry or no net change. As shown here, the number of providers in a zip code area 
has increased monotonically over time. In December 1999, these markets averaged only 0.44 providers 
per market. Four years later, they averaged 1.73 providers per market. There is tremendous variation in 
the distribution of providers. In December 1999, 74% (number from table 2) had no providers while 
others had as many as 9. Four years later, 27% had no providers while other markets had as many as 17. 
Entry and incumbency occurred steadily over the nine periods except for a surge of entry during 
December 2000 and June 2001. In every 6 month time period, around 10% of the zip codes added at least 
one more net provider. Around 85% had no net change in providers, leaving the residual 5% losing at 
least one provider.  
                                                 
29
 We do not include Puerto Rico zip codes in the universe of the zip codes. We also delete zip code areas with 
“HH” or “XX” as the last two digits. They are specially coded by the Census Bureau to cover large water areas or 
rural areas with few people (e.g. parks, forest lands, desert, and mountainous areas). 
30
 A typical zip code area in this category covers a radius less than 1 mile. 
31
 We can show that there is strong positive correlation between population residing in a ZCTA and the area size of 
this ZCTA when metropolitan ZCTAs are dropped from the sample. 
32
 We have tried some different cutoff points in all steps of selecting the sample (specifically, dropping the top and 
bottom 10% based on population density and/or dropping zip codes with populations below [2500, 4000]). The 
results are similar.  
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Table 2 reports the proportion of zip codes with various numbers of providers in each of the 
periods. There was considerable entry over the four years. Almost 50% of the zip codes experienced a 
first entrant during the period. The most significant growth was in the 1 to 3 provider category, with the 
share of zip codes in that group rising from 26% to 64% over the period. 
Table 3 describes demographic variables previously identified by Prieger (2003) as relevant to 
market profitability.33 On average, our zip code markets have a population of 1020 with a land area of 54 
square miles.34 The vast majority are White, with 5% African American, 4% Hispanic, 2% Native 
American, and 0.4% Asian. Median household income average $35 thousand with 38% percent of the 
population having had at least some college education. Around one-third of the population is over 60. 
Around 5% of the working population work at home, while around 20% have to spend more than 40 
minutes commuting to work. Around 20% of households rent, and the vast majority (96%) have a 
telephone at home. Because of our sample selection criteria, 92 % of the population is rural. On average, 
there are 167 business establishments per thousand population.35 
 
4. RESULTS 
 A closer look at the data can give us an idea why a static framework without sunk costs cannot be 
applied to an industry with significant growth. Table 4 reports the percentage of all the zip codes with n  
firms that experienced net entry or no net change over each 6 month period under study. As of June 2000, 
31.7% of the markets with 1 to 3 providers gained at least one provider. The percentage decreases over 
time so that by December 2003, only 7.5% of the markets with 1 to 3 firms had experienced net entry 
                                                 
33
 Prieger (2003) investigates whether there is unequal broadband availability in areas with high concentrations of 
poor, minority, or rural households. He identifies various demographic factors affecting the availability of 
broadband access.         
34
 The population density is 188 per square mile on average. Note, the population density is a non-linear function of 
population and land area, therefore the mean of the population density is different from the mean of population 
divided by the mean of land area. 
35
 Both distributions of population density and firm density are highly skewed to the right.  For population density, 
the median is around 29; for firm density, the median is around 17. This is why we take log of both density variables 
and use the log form in the estimation. 
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over the previous six months.  The rest of the categories display a similar pattern, but the change over 
time is much smaller. This suggests that entry into the 1 to 3 provider category happens much earlier than 
entry into other categories. While markets with 4n >  providers still experience significant entry at the 
end of the time period, markets with 1 to 3 providers are composed mostly of incumbents. In that group, 
91% experienced no net entry or exit in the six-month period ending in December 2003. Without 
considering the sunk costs which only entrants have to incur, the static framework will generate a 
weighted average of the “true” entry threshold and a smaller, exit threshold----the market size that allows 
the thn  incumbent firm to remain in business. Therefore, the estimation results without sunk costs will 
underestimate entry thresholds for all categories, with the bias most significant for the category with 1-3 
firms toward the end of our survey period when incumbents dominate the sample. We conjecture that the 
framework without sunk costs will overestimate the entry threshold ratios most from the 1-3 provider 
category to the 4 firm category, especially in the later periods as incumbency dominates. 
 In reviewing the results, it is important to keep in mind how data limitations may affect our 
interpretation of the estimates. First, because we observe net entry and exit numbers and not the number 
of entrants and exits, we treat as equals markets where one firm enters and markets where three firms exit 
and four firms enter. Second, we treat each entrant as homogeneous even though they may be using 
different modes of service delivery, are independent firms or part of a regional or national entity, and may 
serve as few as 200 customers up to an undetermined upper-limit. Our data and model does not capture 
any heterogeneity along these lines. Third, the FCC lumps one to three providers in a single category for 
confidentiality reasons, and this prevents us from assessing firm conduct in progressing from local 
monopoly to local duopoly and on to local triopoly.  We will make note of how these limitations alter our 
interpretations as we discuss our results. 
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4.1  Results of Our Baseline Model 
 Table 5 reports estimates from our baseline model, where sunk costs are incorporated. We will 
report the results from the BR model later for comparison. Note that each regression requires a 
normalization of the variance of the error term, and so we can only compare coefficient signs and 
significance but not magnitudes across time periods. Population size is a significant determinant of the 
number of providers operating in a zip code. Zip codes with a higher percentage of Native Americans 
discourage the presence of broadband providers, while a higher percentage of Asians raises the number of 
providers. Evidence on the impact of Black and Hispanic populations is mixed. Richer and better-
educated populations attract more providers, while zip codes with larger households,36 more females, and 
more senior citizens discourage them. Populations that rent or have longer commuting distances attract 
broadband services, while population that work from home have little impact and population with 
telephones has mixed impact. Rural areas attract fewer providers, while areas with more prosperous 
businesses activity, as measured by firm density, attract more. On the contrary, higher population density 
lowers the number of providers ---- we think this may be due to the high colinearity between population 
size and population density measures. Most of these coefficients are stable over time and statistically 
significant.  
In table 5, the cutoff points ntµ  and sunk costs tSC  are estimated with very good precision. Table 
6a reports results calculated from the estimates of the coefficients, cutoff points, and sunk costs in table 5. 
Table 6a reports entry threshold, which is the market size necessary to support n  firms in a market with 
net entry at time t , as measured by population size in thousands. Note that these thresholds are 
comparable across time periods because they are defined as ratios of coefficients, and so the units cancel 
out. As time goes by, less population is necessary to support a given number of providers. As shown in 
the table, around 3,492 people are necessary for a zip code area to support 1 to 3 providers in December 
                                                 
36
 People in the same household usually share one broadband provider so larger households reduce effective 
demand. 
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1999, while only 1,981 people are necessary in December 2003. Similarly, around 7,962 people are 
necessary to support 4 providers in December 1999 but only 4,179 in December 2003. The rapid 
reduction in the number of people necessary to support a given number of providers suggests either that 
broadband demand is growing rapidly over the four years, that technology is rapidly lowering production 
cost, or both. 
Table 7a reports entry thresholds derived from the model without the sunk costs of entry.37  As 
we discussed earlier, we expect that the framework without sunk costs will underestimate entry thresholds 
by estimating a weighted average of entry and exit thresholds, especially for entry into the 1-3 firm 
category. The bias would increase later in the period as incumbents increased in proportion to the total 
number of firms. Table 7a confirms our expectations. Every threshold reported here is smaller than its 
counterpart in table 6a. By December 1999, the population necessary to support a 1-3 firm oligopoly was 
2,349, while the baseline estimate was 3,492; by December 2003, the population necessary to support the 
same market structure was 204 rather than 1,981 as estimated in the baseline model. These patterns are 
the same for all other market structures. In other words, the framework without sunk costs generates a 
downward bias in estimating entry thresholds.  
Figure 3 is a graphical illustration of this bias, which can be measured by the gap between the 
solid and dotted line for the same market structure category. For clarity we only show estimates for 
1 3n = −  and 4n = . We can see that the bias falls in June 2001 when there was a surge of entry. Then 
the bias jumps in magnitude in December 2001 when new firm entry dropped and the incumbent share 
rose sharply. The bias is especially large for 1 3n = −  in later periods, exactly as we have conjectured. 
 
                                                 
37
 The coefficient estimates for the control variables in this no-sunk-cost model are very close to the baseline model, 
except that in this model the estimated effect of population increased much more rapidly over years. We suspect that 
this is because the population coefficient absorbs some of the ignored effects of entry costs in the framework 
without sunk costs.  
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4.2  Construction of Entry Threshold Ratios 
Now we need to analyze the entry threshold ratios, from which we can infer changes in 
competitive conduct as a new firm enters the market. As discussed earlier, if 
1
1
n
t
n
t
s
s
+
=  there is no change 
in competitive conduct in moving from n  to 1n +  firms in the zip code area. 
The weakness in our data is that it does not distinguish between  1, 2, or 3 providers in a given zip 
code. As a result, we are not able to detect any change in competitive conduct in the 1 to 3 provider 
category. Luckily, the policy focus of the FCC is on whether a smaller, competitive provider can bring 
competition into the market place. For example, the 1996 Telecommunication Act subsidizes the entry of 
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs), which mostly provide telephone and broadband services 
to small businesses. Given that in the broadband market the first two entrants are almost always the local 
cable company and the Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC), we know that from the 3rd entrant on 
the new entrant must be a smaller, competitive provider. So the change in competitive conduct outside of 
the 1-3 provider category is still relevant for policy: would the fourth entrant make any difference in the 
competitive conduct of local broad markets? If yes, then the policy of subsidizing multiple entries seems 
solid. If no, then the FCC does not need to subsidize additional entry beyond the third, as we know that 
subsidies often distort economic incentives, because as few as 3 providers are sufficient to create a 
competitive environment.  
To evaluate competitive conduct, we exploit some supplemental information provided by the 
FCC.  Their semi-annual reports include the distribution of 1-, 2- and 3-provider markets at the national 
level in every period, allowing us to develop bounds for the relevant market sizes to support entry in the 1 
to 3 provider category. Denote 1 3_S entry −  as the necessary market size to support the entry of one, two, 
or three firms, and let np  be the percentage of providers in the thn category ( 1, 2, 3n or= ) among all 1 
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to 3 firm oligopoly market.38 On average, 1 3_S entry −  is an overestimate of the market size necessary to 
support an entrant but an underestimate of the market size necessary to support three entrants. Given that 
ns is the average market size supporting entry of the thn  firm, we can write 1 3_S entry −  as: 
(12) 1 3 1 1 2 2 3 3_ * 2 * 3 *S entry s p s p s p− = + +  
Note the above equation is an ad hoc approximation only to get around our data limitations. As 
such, these results should be viewed as suggestive due to the measurement error in true local np .  
Note that it takes at least the same market size to support another firm, and so we can assume that 
1 2 3s s s≤ ≤ . Under this assumption, equation (12) becomes 
(13) ( )1 3 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 3 1_ * * *S entry s p s p s p s p p p s− ≥ + + ≥ + + =  
and 
(14) ( )1 3 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 3_ * 2 * 3 * 2 3S entry s p s p s p s p p p− = + + ≤ + +  
Following (13) and (14), we can derive an upper bound for 1s  and a lower bound for 3s : 
(15) 1 1 3_s S entry −≤  
(16) ( )
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Given these bounds, we can further derive a lower bound for 
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s
 and an upper bound for 
4
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s
s
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 We omit the t  subscript in this discussion to simplify notion. 
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We can interpret the lower bound for 
4
1
s
s
 as the lower bound of the average change in competitive 
conduct when the 4th firm enters a monopoly market39 and the upper bound for 4
3
s
s
 as the upper bound of 
the average change in competitive conduct when the 4th firm enters a three-firm oligopoly market. 
Combining the two bounds, we can infer the change of competitive conduct when the fourth firm enters a 
one to three firm oligopoly market structure. 
Tables 7a and 7b report entry threshold ratios for our baseline model and the no-sunk-costs 
model, respectively. As shown in both table 7a and 7b, when 4n > , 
1n
n
s
s
+
 is close to unity with only 
slight increases over time, suggesting that competitive conduct is stable when market structure goes 
beyond four firms. These ratios are slightly below one, suggesting that some sort of product/cost 
differentiation is involved in the new entry.  
However, the two models paint drastically different pictures pertaining to the entry of the 4th firm. 
In the absence of sunk costs, table 7b shows rising values for 
4
1
s lower bound
s
and 
4
3
s
upper bound
s
. 
This implies that entry into a 1-3 firm oligopoly market gets progressively more difficult over time. In 
December 1999, competitive conduct changes only modestly as the 4th firm is added.  By December 2003, 
it takes at least 3.4 times the monopoly market size and as much as 6.8 times the market size inducing the 
third entrant to support entry of the 4th  firm. Incorporating sunk costs in table 7a, however, we find only 
small rising deviations from unity for 
4
3
s
upper bound
s
. As 4
3
s
s
 is theoretically bounded above unity, 
these upper bounds hint that the competitive conduct from a 1-3 firm oligopoly to a 4-firm market 
                                                 
39
 This happens when three firms enter a monopoly market concurrently. 
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changed only slightly over time.40 Therefore, though we are not able to infer the competitive conduct 
change inside the 1-to-3 firm category due to data limitations, we are safe in concluding that the fringe 
players from the 4th firm on have little effect on the competitive conduct of the broadband market.  
Figure 4 illustrate the comparison of the results from the two models, without or with sunk costs 
of entry. Note that we use 
4
3
s
upper bound
s
 as the first data point for every time period and the vertical 
axes of the left and right panel use different scale to be able to see the variation of entry threshold ratios in 
the right panel. The left panel shows much more dramatic change in competitive conduct as the fourth 
firm enters than the right panel does. Beyond the fourth firm, both panels suggest that the entry conditions 
stabilize. Back to the questions we ask in the beginning: Does the fourth entrant make any difference in 
the competitive conduct of a local broadband market? The answer is clearly positive in light of the 
findings in the left panel. However, the right panel produces the opposite answer, which indicates that he 
change in competitive conduct must have occurred before the arrival of the fourth firm. The policy 
implication of this answer is significant in the broadband market: given most local markets are already 
served by a cable company and an ILEC, subsidizing just another entrant might suffice to bring in 
effective competition. 
Is the industry becoming increasing competitive over time? In table 8, we test formally for 
systematic differences in entry threshold ratios over time under our baseline model. We use likelihood 
ratio tests to examine whether entry threshold ratios remain unchanged from period 1t −  to t . To 
perform the test for the null hypothesis 11 1
1
n n
t t
n n
t t
s s
s s
−
− −
−
= , we constrain ntµ  to be a function of other 
coefficients and obtain the new log likelihood under the constraint. There is a statistically significant 
change over time in competitive conduct from a 1-3 firm oligopoly to a 4-firm market. Moreover, this 
                                                 
40
 The lower bound for 
4
1
s
s
is less informative as the numbers are well below one. 
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change shows some, if not huge, economical significance as shown in table 7a, implying the entry 
conditions for the 4th firm has indeed changed somewhat over the fours years of our observation.  
Furthermore, in June 2003 the change from last period is statistically significant for almost every 
category, showing that the period from December 2002 and June 2003 displays more conduct change than 
any other period.   
 
4.3  Do Entry Costs Vary with the Order of Entry? 
Tables 9a and 9b report results from the first extension of our baseline model which allows entry 
costs to vary with the order of entry. Recall that our baseline model is the most restrictive model, 
assuming 1 3 4 5 6 7t t t t tSC SC SC SC SC
−
= = = = . In table 9a, we allow the sunk costs of entrants into the 1-3 
firm oligopoly market to be different from the later entrants. In table 9b, we allow the sunk costs of the 4th 
entrant to be different as well. As most coefficient estimates are very close to the baseline model, we only 
report estimates for the entry costs ntSC . The pattern of estimates in both tables is that sunk entry costs 
into the 1-3 firm oligopoly market are smaller than for later entrants, but only for the early time periods. 
  Table 9c reports likelihood ratio tests for the null hypotheses 1 3 4 5 6 7t t t t tSC SC SC SC SC
−
= = = =  
and 1 3 4 5 6 7t t t t tSC SC SC SC SC
− ≠ = = = . The test results show that we can reject the null hypotheses 
1 3 4 5 6 7
t t t t tSC SC SC SC SC
−
= = = =  but cannot reject 1 3 4 5 6 7t t t t tSC SC SC SC SC− ≠ = = =  for these early 
periods.  These test results support the findings in table 9a and 9b, i.e. in early broadband market the 
entrants into the 1- to 3- firm oligopoly market has distinctively different entry costs than the later 
entrants. As Greenstein (2000) argues, many small and medium providers took strategic positions as early 
movers into new technology and new services as a way to develop local customer bases and differentiate 
from their branded national rivals. Our evidences support his argument: early mover advantages seem to 
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discount entry costs for early entrants into the broadband market, or put it another way, increase the 
“strategic” entry costs for later entrants. 
 
4.4  How Important is County-specific Heterogeneity? 
Table 10a, 10b, and 10c reports results from the second extension of our baseline model, which 
allows county-level random effects. As table 10a shows, the variance of the country-specific error countyη  
is estimated with high precision. Comparing table 5 and table 10a, we can see that controlling for random 
effects greatly improves the log likelihood. Though table 10a hints at the importance of allowing 
profitability of adjacent markets to be correlated, table 10b and 10c suggests otherwise. In tables 10b and 
10c, the estimated entry thresholds and entry threshold ratios change little compared to tables 6a and 7a. 
In fact, all the structural parameters and their variances are similar with or without county-level random 
effects. With our large sample of zip codes, the baseline model is already estimated with good precision. 
If the sample size is small and parameters are less precisely estimated, we suspect that incorporating 
market random effects might play a more significant role. The relative ease with which market-level 
heterogeneity can be incorporated into our adapted framework will help in future investigations of 
markets structures that have more limited samples.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper we incorporate sunk costs into an empirical framework estimating a discrete game of 
firm entry and exit. Application of our framework to a fast evolving market ---- the broadband market 
from 1999 to 2003 ---- displays a drastically different picture from the one well established in the 
literature. The huge variations in the changes of competitive conduct when the 4th firm enters exist only as 
an artifact of disregarding entry and exit in the empirical framework. Our results show that there are only 
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small variations of entry threshold ratios. Once the market has between one to three firms, the fourth 
entrant has little effect on competitive conduct in the local broadband market.  
The results we have derived, however, do have nontrivial flaws. First, we include sunk costs in a 
model without real dynamics. Second, the data we use lump 1 to 3 providers in the same category so we 
cannot capture the actions inside this category. The misspecification resulted from these flaws does 
restrict us from making policy-relevant suggestions. For example, we cannot advise on a subsidy policy 
which reduces the sunk cost of entry with the goal of encouraging the arrival of more broadband 
providers. This said, our work improves upon the original static entry framework by distinguishing 
between entrants and incumbents and sheds highlight on the importance of sunk costs in determining 
entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct. 
Some may argue that short-term dynamics such as learning or adjustment costs may be the 
driving force in shaping the short-run market structure in a rapidly evolving industry. For example, 
preemption incentives may lead to early entry in the emerging stages of an industry, or firms overestimate 
profitability before entry and decide to exit after learning the market conditions. We have no objection to 
this view, however, we think that incorporating sunk costs is the very first step in modeling entry and exit 
before allowing for any short-term dynamics. If our empirical model had produced dramatically different 
or inconsistent estimates of entry behaviors in the various stages of the industry in study, then we should 
have started to investigate what is behind the differences or inconsistencies.    
An immediate next step to this paper should allow for entrants’ expectation of the evolution of 
future market structure.  For example, firms may have a greater incentive to be among the first set of 
entrants if they expect that the market will support a stable oligopoly market structure rather than 
inducing additional entry that quickly dissipates rents. This “preemption” behavior is beyond the 
capability of our current framework and warrants future research.  
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Figure 1 Illustration: How Our Model Identifies Entry Costs 
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Figure 2  Broadband Distribution by Number of Providers per Zip Code 
 
 
December 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2003 
 39 
Table 1  Summary Statistics on Firm Entry, Exit, and Incumbency  
    
 
Variable Mean Standard Error Min Max 
Number of providers in a zip code market  
Dec 1999 0.440 0.769 0 9 
Jun 2000 0.595 0.876 0 11 
Dec 2000 0.801 1.055 0 15 
Jun 2001 0.961 1.126 0 16 
Dec 2001 1.016 1.147 0 14 
Jun 2002 1.207 1.242 0 16 
Dec 2002 1.386 1.277 0 17 
Jun 2003 1.565 1.377 0 16 
Dec 2003 1.726 1.425 0 17 
Zip code market has net entry in the 6 month period (yes=1, no=0) 
Dec 1999—Jun 2000 0.111 0.314 0 1 
Jun 2000—Dec 2000 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Dec 2000—Jun 2001 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Jun 2001—Dec 2001 0.086 0.280 0 1 
Dec 2001—Jun 2002 0.115 0.319 0 1 
Jun 2002—Dec 2002 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Dec 2002—Jun 2003 0.109 0.311 0 1 
Jun 2003—Dec 2003 0.090 0.286 0 1 
Zip code market has no net entry or exit in the 6 month period (yes =1, no=0) 
Dec 1999—Jun 2000 0.863 0.344 0 1 
Jun 2000—Dec 2000 0.864 0.343 0 1 
Dec 2000—Jun 2001 0.798 0.402 0 1 
Jun 2001—Dec 2001 0.854 0.353 0 1 
Dec 2001—Jun 2002 0.860 0.347 0 1 
Jun 2002—Dec 2002 0.852 0.355 0 1 
Dec 2002—Jun 2003 0.867 0.340 0 1 
Jun 2003—Dec 2003 0.885 0.318 0 1 
 
Note: FCC lumps 1 to 3 providers into one category but provides percentage of zip codes 
with 1, 2, and 3 providers in their semiannual report. We use this information to calculate the 
adjusted mean of number of providers in a zip code market in each time period.  
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Table 2  Percentage of Zip Codes with n  Firms 
 
 
 
Dec99 Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
0n =  73.90 65.80  57.73 51.71 49.66 42.33 35.60  30.74  26.93 
1 3n = −  25.77 33.65  40.76 46.30 47.93 53.94 59.71  61.86  63.66 
4n =   0.17  0.30  0.91  1.25  1.55  2.39  3.09  4.85  6.03 
5n =   0.06  0.08  0.24  0.31  0.40  0.63  0.81  1.46  2.00 
6n =   0.04  0.06  0.13  0.16  0.15  0.28  0.26  0.39  0.56 
7n ≥   0.06  0.11  0.24  0.27  0.31  0.43  0.54  0.70  0.81 
14357=N  
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 100% 
 
 
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics of Zip Code Demographics  
 
 
Variable Definition Mean* Standard Error Min Max 
pop/1000 # people living in a zip code, in thousands 1.020 0.743 0.001 2.733 
% Black % population: African Americans 0.050 0.141 0 1 
% Hispanic % population: Hispanics 0.037 0.103 0 1 
% Native % population: Native American  0.023 0.110 0 1 
% Asian % population: Asians 0.004 0.024 0 1 
m_income Household median income 35443 13554 0 200k 
% college % population over 25 with some 
college education  0.383 0.156 0 1 
hh_size Average household size 2.564 0.341 0 10.25 
% female % population: females 0.498 0.039 0 1 
% senior % population over 60 0.327 0.086 0 1 
% w_home % working population over 16 
working at home  0.054 0.058 0 1 
% long_cmu 
% working population over 16 
spending more than 40 minutes on 
commuting  
0.204 0.137 0 1 
% rent % households renting 0.201 0.118 0 1 
% phone % households with a telephone at home 0.956 0.063 0 1 
% rural % population living in rural areas 0.921 0.249 0 1 
land area square miles of land area 53.771 74.228 0.002 1033.6 
pop density # people per square mile 188.081 539.604 2.607 5221.3 
firm density # establishments per thousand of population  166.563 7383.319 0.497 760k 
 
*: This column reports the simple-average of variables across zip codes. 
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Table 4  Patterns on Firm Entry and Incumbency over Time 
 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
% of n -firm Markets with Net Entry 
Markets with 
 
0n =   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1 3n = −  31.71 24.97 26.16  15.13 17.17 15.05 10.56  7.46 
4n =  79.07 88.46 71.51  58.11 62.10 53.95 58.76 42.15 
5n =  72.73 91.43 75.00  58.62 70.33 60.34 70.00 57.49 
6n =  77.78 83.33 52.17  59.09 60.00 50.00 76.79 67.90 
7n ≥  62.50 55.88 28.21  27.27 37.10 25.97 24.75 18.97 
% of n -firm Markets with No Net Entry/Exit 
Markets with 
 
0n =  96.08 96.34 88.20 89.52 95.41 93.66 94.56 96.43 
1 3n = −  68.14 74.91 72.61 83.56 82.13 83.52 88.54 90.97 
4n =  16.28 10.00 22.91 34.23 33.82 38.83 37.50 51.62 
5n =  18.18  5.71 15.91 25.86 25.27 33.62 26.19 36.59 
6n =  11.11 11.11 21.74 18.18 27.50 39.47 23.21 28.40 
7n ≥  37.50 44.12 71.79 72.73 62.90 74.03 75.25 81.03 
 
Note: this table does not report the percentage of n -firm markets with net exit, but readers 
can easily infer the numbers. For example, in Jun 2000 31.71% of 1-3 firm markets have 
experienced net entry and 68.14% have experienced neither net entry nor net exit, therefore 
only 0.15% of these markets have experienced net exit. 
 
 Table 5 MLE Results for the Baseline Model 
  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
pop/1000 0.429 0.481 0.695 0.550 0.602 0.621 0.623 0.617 
 
(0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.024)*** 
% Black -0.438 0.194 0.153 0.010 0.234 0.331 -0.082 0.152 
 
(0.121)*** (0.093)** (0.095) (0.102) (0.105)** (0.093)*** (0.096) (0.103) 
% Hispanic -0.392 0.218 0.356 -0.042 -0.486 -0.073 -0.249 -0.473 
 
(0.182)** (0.132) (0.142)** (0.152) (0.128)*** (0.145) (0.147)* (0.165)*** 
% Native  -0.417 -0.866 -0.493 -0.252 -0.262 0.004 -0.101 0.014 
 
(0.223)* (0.230)*** (0.159)*** (0.134)* (0.152)* (0.163) (0.167) (0.153) 
% Asian 0.353 1.783 1.061 0.827 1.752 0.841 0.653 0.234 
 
(0.462) (0.325)*** (0.346)*** (0.359)** (0.322)*** (0.424)** (0.471) (0.535) 
ln(m_incom) 0.248 0.401 0.420 0.229 0.435 0.289 0.366 0.384 
 
(0.051)*** (0.048)*** (0.040)*** (0.053)*** (0.045)*** (0.044)*** (0.043)*** (0.046)*** 
% college 0.820 0.074 0.808 0.344 0.057 0.314 0.352 -0.076 
 
(0.114)*** (0.113) (0.098)*** (0.111)*** (0.103) (0.107)*** (0.101)*** (0.110) 
hh_size -0.178 -0.179 -0.141 -0.139 -0.172 -0.160 -0.054 -0.052 
 
(0.063)*** (0.051)*** (0.047)*** (0.049)*** (0.052)*** (0.053)*** (0.052) (0.065) 
% female -0.749 -0.683 -1.199 -1.055 -1.300 -0.940 -0.866 -0.742 
 
(0.308)** (0.280)** (0.286)*** (0.299)*** (0.270)*** (0.264)*** (0.287)*** (0.344)** 
% senior -0.253 -0.618 -0.028 -0.295 -0.529 -0.202 0.082 -0.465 
 
(0.213) (0.197)*** (0.187) (0.200) (0.199)*** (0.204) (0.202) (0.236)** 
% w_home 0.204 -0.165 0.368 0.144 0.327 0.378 0.150 0.393 
 
(0.256) (0.251) (0.254) (0.254) (0.240) (0.275) (0.276) (0.315) 
% long_cmu 0.638 0.516 -0.027 0.345 0.129 0.428 0.249 -0.167 
 
(0.118)*** (0.113)*** (0.101) (0.107)*** (0.109) (0.103)*** (0.106)** (0.116) 
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% rent 1.085 0.368 0.902 0.603 0.521 0.692 0.691 0.644 
 
(0.135)*** (0.119)*** (0.113)*** (0.126)*** (0.115)*** (0.113)*** (0.113)*** (0.124)*** 
% phone 0.626 0.131 -0.334 -0.398 0.028 0.670 0.601 0.681 
 
(0.330)* (0.318) (0.270) (0.259)*** (0.275) (0.306)** (0.280)** (0.334)** 
% rural -0.113 -0.423 -0.349 -0.341 -0.408 -0.419 -0.496 -0.359 
 
(0.076) (0.071)*** (0.067)*** (0.073)*** (0.068)*** (0.066)*** (0.066)*** (0.071)*** 
ln(pop_dsty) 0.004 -0.023 -0.136 -0.045 -0.073 -0.128 -0.136 -0.119 
 
(0.014) (0.014)* (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** 
ln(firm_dsty) 0.117 0.060 0.138 0.149 0.097 0.106 0.106 0.082 
 
(0.018)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** 
 
        
1 3µ −  2.438 2.283 2.943 0.756 2.033 1.475 2.234 2.081 
 
(0.516)*** (0.507)*** (0.401)*** (0.522) (0.448)*** (0.422)*** (0.426)*** (0.448)*** 
4µ  4.357 3.817 4.833 2.289 3.601 3.155 3.603 3.436 
 
(0.475)*** (0.486)*** (0.384)*** (0.516)*** (0.438)*** (0.416)*** (0.421)*** (0.443)*** 
5µ  4.740 4.266 5.320 2.775 4.095 3.681 4.147 3.937 
 
(0.451)*** (0.472)*** (0.373)*** (0.511)*** (0.431)*** (0.409)*** (0.418)*** (0.444)*** 
6µ  4.913 4.528 5.615 3.089 4.421 4.033 4.580 4.381 
 
(0.499)*** (0.488)*** (0.389)*** (0.521)*** (0.439)*** (0.409)*** (0.416)*** (0.446)*** 
7µ  5.135 4.737 5.857 3.345 4.689 4.224 4.846 4.691 
 
(0.551)*** (0.535)*** (0.432)*** (0.549)*** (0.469)*** (0.448)*** (0.447)*** (0.469)*** 
tSC  2.202 2.374 1.678 2.034 2.374 2.239 2.479 2.695 
 
(0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.033)*** (0.035)*** 
 
        
ln L  -5537.3 -5868.2 -6962.8 -6261.2 -6033.2 -6186.2 -6324.3 -5776.4 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors for all tables reporting estimation results. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%, and *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 6a Entry Thresholds: the Baseline Model 
 
 
Population (in thousands) Needed to Support n  Firms with Net Entry 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
1 3n = −  3.492 3.010 2.055 2.695 2.166 1.884 1.922 1.981 
4n =  7.962 6.200 4.774 5.483 4.770 4.588 4.119 4.179 
5n =  8.855 7.133 5.473 6.368 5.590 5.434 4.992 4.991 
6n =  9.258 7.680 5.899 6.939 6.131 6.000 5.687 5.711 
7n ≥  9.775 8.114 6.247 7.406 6.575 6.308 6.114 6.215 
 
Note: We calculate entry thresholds (Table 6a) and entry threshold ratios (Table 7a) using the coefficient estimates in table 5. We also calculate the standard 
errors for entry thresholds and entry threshold ratios using the Delta method. In table 6a and 7a, all estimates are at least significant at 10% level; the 
majority of them are significant at 1% level. To save space, we do not report standard errors in these tables. Similarly, we do not report standard 
errors in tables 6b, 7b, 10b and 10c. 
 
Table 6b Entry Thresholds: No Sunk Costs 
 
 
Population (in thousands) Necessary to Support n  firms 
 
Dec99 Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
1 3n = −  2.349 1.790 1.347 1.074 0.993 0.742 0.521 0.346 0.204 
4n =  6.888 6.049 4.873 4.033 3.829 3.454 3.238 2.942 2.756 
5n =  7.480 6.670 5.539 4.614 4.420 4.032 3.831 3.576 3.387 
6n =  7.864 6.949 5.892 4.910 4.755 4.358 4.172 3.996 3.837 
7n ≥  8.263 7.271 6.164 5.150 4.960 4.603 4.356 4.196 4.073 
Figure 3 Entry Thresholds over Time 
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Table 7a  Entry Threshold Ratios: the Baseline Model 
 
 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
4
1
s lower bound
s
 
0.570 0.515 0.581 0.509 0.550 0.609 0.536 0.527 
4
3
s
upper bound
s
 
0.960 0.913 1.080 0.952 1.042 1.178 1.044 1.055 
5
4
s
s
 
0.890 0.920 0.917 0.929 0.937 0.948 0.969 0.955 
6
5
s
s
 
0.871 0.897 0.898 0.908 0.914 0.920 0.949 0.954 
7
6
s
s
 
0.905 0.906 0.908 0.915 0.919 0.901 0.921 0.933 
  
 
Table 7b Entry Threshold Ratios: No Sunk Costs 
 
 
 
Dec99 Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
4
1
s lower bound
s
 
0.733 0.845 0.904 0.939 0.964 1.164 1.554 2.126 3.382 
4
3
s
upper bound
s
 
1.204 1.423 1.604 1.745 1.803 2.203 3.005 4.145 6.763 
5
4
s
s
 
0.869 0.882 0.909 0.915 0.924 0.934 0.946 0.972 0.983 
6
5
s
s
 
0.876 0.868 0.886 0.887 0.896 0.901 0.907 0.931 0.944 
7
6
s
s
 
0.901 0.897 0.897 0.899 0.894 0.905 0.895 0.900 0.910 
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Figure 4 Entry Threshold Ratios over Time 
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Table 8 Likelihood Ratio Tests for Constant Entry Threshold Ratios over Time 
 
 
 
Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
Test for 
4 4
1
1 1
1
t t
t t
s slower bound lower bound
s s
−
−
=  
0.043 17.513*** 9.791** 4.721** 1.520 0.163 0.801 
Test for 
4 4
1
3 3
1
t t
t t
s s
upper bound upper bound
s s
−
−
=
 
5.373** 93.442*** 28.118*** 32.117*** 47.178*** 23.982*** 0.054 
Test for 
5 5
1
4 4
1
t t
t t
s s
s s
−
−
=  
5.941** 3.928** 0.120 3.001* 0.833 10.918*** 0.547 
Test for 
6 6
1
5 5
1
t t
t t
s s
s s
−
−
=  4.818** 5.783** 0.318 2.482 0.281 12.839*** 1.227 
Test for 
7 7
1
6 6
1
t t
t t
s s
s s
−
−
=  0.807 5.233** 0.328 1.855 1.109 8.689*** 2.595 
 
 Table 9a MLE Results: Extension 1, 1 3 4 5 6 7t t t t tSC SC SC SC SC
− ≠ = = =  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
1 3
tSC
−
 2.196 2.367 1.659 2.032 2.370 2.244 2.494 2.876 
 
(0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.036)*** (0.042)*** 
4
tSC  2.532 2.684 1.923 2.050 2.399 2.220 2.429 2.404 
 
(0.240)*** (0.194)*** (0.100)*** (0.085)*** (0.088)*** (0.066)*** (0.065)*** (0.055)*** 
         
ln L  -5536.3 -5867.0 -6959.2 -6261.2 -6033.1 -6186.1.6 -6323.9 -5750.2 
 
 
Table 9b MLE Results: Extension 1, 1 3 4 5 6 7t t t t tSC SC SC SC SC
− ≠ ≠ = =  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
1 3
tSC
−
 2.196 2.367 1.658 2.032 2.369 2.243 2.492 2.876 
 
(0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.036)*** (0.042)*** 
4
tSC  2.534 2.614 1.858 2.026 2.362 2.188 2.380 2.402 
 
(0.242)*** (0.209)*** (0.102)*** (0.087)*** (0.091)*** (0.067)*** (0.068)*** (0.056)*** 
5
tSC  2.531 2.776 2.112 2.130 2.479 2.305 2.538 2.406 
 
(0314)*** (0.244)*** (0.133)*** (0.120)*** (0.119)*** (0.094)*** (0.086)*** (0.072)*** 
         
ln L  -5536.3 -5866.7 -6956.2 -6260.6 -6032.5 -6185.0 -6321.8 -5750.2 
 
 
Table 9c Likelihood Ratio Tests for Entry Costs Proportionality 
 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
Test for 
1 3 4 5 6 7
t t t t tSC SC SC SC SC
−
= = = =  
 
1.974 2.834* 7.147*** 0.100 0.160 0.178 0.817 52.310*** 
Test for 
1 3 4 5 6 7
t t t t tSC SC SC SC SC
− ≠ = = =  
 
0.016 0.600 5.970** 1.112 1.349 2.332 4.046** 0.006 
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Table 10a MLE Results: Extension 2, Allowing County-level Random Effects 
  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
2
,county tσ
 
0.864 0.697 0.560 0.652 0.462 0.443 0.450 0.489 
 
(0.016)**
* 
(0.016)**
* 
(0.015)**
* 
(0.016)**
* 
(0.017)**
* 
(0.016)**
* 
(0.016)**
* 
(0.017)**
* 
         
ln L  -4950.9 -5585.6 -6762.5 -6022.6 -5941.2 -6094.2 -6237.7 -5686.0 
 
 
 
Table 10b Entry Thresholds: Extension 2, Allowing County-level Random Effects 
 
 
Population (in thousands) Needed to Support n  firms 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
1 3n = −  3.720 3.071 2.170 2.898 2.223 1.926 1.946 1.969 
4n =  8.249 6.514 5.123 5.928 4.957 4.743 4.241 4.220 
5n =  9.034 7.462 5.868 6.846 5.815 5.611 5.152 5.044 
6n =  9.388 8.000 6.307 7.431 6.386 6.188 5.879 5.775 
7n ≥  9.839 8.422 6.671 7.877 6.848 6.496 6.314 6.281 
 
 
Table 10c Entry Threshold Ratios: Extension 2, Allowing County-level Random Effects 
 
 
Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
4
1
s lower bound
s
 
0.554 0.530 0.590 0.511 0.557 0.616 0.545 0.536 
4
3
s
upper bound
s
 
0.934 0.940 1.097 0.957 1.055 1.191 1.062 1.072 
5
4
s
s
 
0.876 0.916 0.916 0.924 0.939 0.946 0.972 0.956 
6
5
s
s
 
0.866 0.893 0.896 0.905 0.915 0.919 0.951 0.954 
7
6
s
s
 
0.898 0.902 0.907 0.908 0.919 0.900 0.921 0.932 
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